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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Todd E. Turner, was charged with three 
counts of burglary, second degree f e l o n i e s , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6*202(1) (1953), as amended, and three counts of 
t h e f t , th ird degree f e l o n i e s , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. S 
76-6-404 (1953) , as amended. 
Defendant was convicted of a l l charges, in a jury t r i a l 
held August 8 - 9 , 1985, in the Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court, in 
and for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable J . Dennis 
Frederick, pres id ing . Judge Frederick sentenced Defendant on 
September 17 , 1985 to an indeterminate term of one to f i f t e e n 
years , on each burglary count, and from zero t o f i v e years on 
each the f t count t o be served in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 8 , 1985 at 11:00 p.m., Utah Highway Patrol 
trooper James Ricnard Buordon clocked a Volkswagen proceeding 
westbound down Parley96 Canyon on I n t e r s t a t e 80 in excess of the 
speed l i m i t (T. 105-106) . He gave chase with h i s overhead po l i ce 
l i g h t s and presumably his s i ren on (T. 106-107) •- When the 
dr iver fa i led t o respond, the officer drove alongside the 
Volkswagen and motioned for the driver to pul l over (T. 106) . 
Ibe off icer noticed the car was fu l l of something stacked c lear 
t o the roof (T. 106) . 
After a couple of minutes, the driver (defendant* 
appe l lan t , Todd Emmit Turner (T. 112*113)) stopped the vehicle on 
the side of the freeway (T. 107) • Be and hi6 passenger (co-
defendant, Darin Brent HcEwan (T. I l l ) ) immediately jumped out of 
the Volkswagen and ran toward the off icer (T. 107-108). Officer 
Buordon threw his car door open, hid behind i t , drew h is service 
revolver, and ordered them to s top (T. 108) . They kept running 
toward him, and he again ordered them to s top , which they f i na l l y 
did (T. 108) . Be had them return t o the Volkswagen and put t h e i r 
hands on the vehicle (T. 110). McEwan then ran for the guard 
r a i l , jumped over i t and disappeared i n t o the bushes (T. 110) . 
Be was l a t e r apprehended. 
Defendant Turner was handcuffed. Be refused t o divulge 
h i s name, date of b i r th or address t o Officer Buordon (T. I l l ) , 
but l a t e r provided the information t o a back-up off icer (T. 112-
113)* The car was reg i s te red t o h i s wife (T. 112-113, 115). The 
of f ice rs learned the re was a bench warrant for f a i l u r e to appear 
out agains t Turner. Defendant was also given a f i e l d sobriety 
t e s t and was l a t e r a r res ted for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (T. 126). 
1
 When asked i f he turned the s i ren on, Officer Bourdon rep l i ed , 
"I don ' t r eca l l if I did or not , but I must have. I usually do 
when someone does not respond t o the l i g h t s . " (T. 107) . 
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The contents of the Volkswagen were inventoried, and 
placed in po l i ce custody (T. 115*116). The items inventoried 
included two RCA PL-100 t e l e v i s i o n s e t s , one Zenith t e l e v i s i o n 
and one R e a l i s t i c tape deck (T. 116)—items which were reported 
s t o l e n from a condominium complex in Park Ci ty , Utah that same 
day (T. 17-19 , 23-25, 28 , 90-91) . Neither defendant ever offered 
an explanation for the i r possess ion of t h i s property. 
Jupiter Property Management was responsible for renting 
and cleaning the condominium uni t s in quest ion (T. 1 5 - 1 7 ) . They 
a l so monitor and inventory items in each of the units (T. 15, 
9 0 ) . The items in quest ion were discovered missing by Jupiter 
s ta f f on April 8 , 1985, and missing property reports were f i l e d 
on that date (T. 17 , 2 1 - 2 2 ) . The pol ice were ca l l ed af ter the 
owners of the condominium unit6 had been consulted by Jupiter 
s t a f f (T. 75-77) . 
Te l ev i s ions were missing from condominium uni t s A, E 
and 2B (T. 17-18) . The s e r i a l number on the Zenith t e l e v i s i o n 
recovered from the Volkswagen matched the number on the 
condominium inventory l i s t for the t e l e v i s i o n in unit 2B (T. 2 9 ) . 
Also , a spec ia l i z ed s t i cker used by Jupiter Property Management 
was found on the Zenith t e l e v i s i o n (T. 4 1 , 6 6 ) . The two RCA 
t e l e v i s i o n s e t s recovered from the Volkswagen were i d e n t i f i e d by 
J u p i t e r ' s general manager as being s imilar t o those missing from 
u n i t s A and E (T. 2 4 ) . An empty R e a l i s t i c c a s s e t t e tape recorder 
box was located in Unit E, and the s e r i a l number on the box 
matched the one on the recorder recovered from the Volkswagen (T. 
100-101) . 
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There was other evidence of burglary• Unit 2B had been 
forcibly entered (T. 103). Although Units A and E showed no 
signs of forced entry (T. 45, 94, 102-104), co-defendant McEwan 
was employed as a housekeeper by Jupiter Property Management (T. 
43) and in that capacity, he had access to the keys to the 
condominiums (T. 43, 46, 70) . The owners own locked c losets in 
Units A and E had been forcibly entered apparently with a crowbar 
recovered at the scene (T. 21-22, 97-98, 100-101). McEwan did 
not have key access to these locked c lose ts (T. 44) . The 
contents of these c lose ts were in disarray (T. 21-22, 97-98). 
Finally, in unit 2B, a bedspread was missing, and in Unit E, a 
clay piggy bank had been broken into (T. 18, 22). 
The las t inventory checks on condominium units A and E 
had been made on April 6 , 1985 (T. 21, 22, 91). Unit 2B had been 
checked on April 7, 1985 (T. 22 ) . Nothing was noted missing on 
those occasions. 
On October 10, 1985, Kim Eisenhart, a f i e ld supervisor 
over housekeeping with Jupiter Property Management, overheard a 
phone conversation where co-defendant McEwan asked the other 
person if he had been "popped* on those burglaries (T. 140). 
McEwan then told the cal ler that there was a police officer 
outside, that he (McEwan) was sure they would be running the 
numbers on the T.V.'s , that they should get together, and that he 
was sure they were going to be arrested (T. 134, 140). After 
McEwan9s phone conversation, Ms. Eisenhart asked him why he had 
been "stealing from us" and he replied that he "wouldn't get 
caught, and he wouldn't do i t anymore." (T. 136-37). McEwan had 
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a l s o had a conversation on April 9 , 1985 with co-workers 
concerning ge t t ing pul led over the night before for a DUI (T. 
135) . Although Eiaenhart did not personally know a Todd Turner, 
•he had heard h i s name mentioned before (T. 147) . 
Neither defendant Turner, nor co-defendant McEwan had 
been given permission t o remove the items from the condominium 
u n i t s <T. 42-44 , 75 -77) • 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant's failure to raise any objection at 
t r ia l to the jury instructions bars review of defendant's 
challenges to them on appeal. The alleged errors in the jury 
instructions are not sufficient so as to warrant review of the 
issues under the plain error doctrine. 
Point II• Defendant's insufficiency of evidence claim 
i s not adequately supported by reference to the record or by 
legal analysis so as to warrant review by th is Court. The law 
does not require direct evidence to establish elements of 
offenses. Circumstantial evidence wi l l suff ice . The State 
suff ic ient ly established defendant's guilt by evidence of 
defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen property 




DEPENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT AT TRIAL TO THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROCLUDES HIS CHALLENGING 
THEM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
In Points I and II of h i s brief on appeal , defendant 
contends that jury i n s t r u c t i o n NOB. 17, 18 and 192 offered by the 
State and given at t r i a l created an unconst i tut ional mandatory 
rebuttable presumption and impermissibly sh i f t ed the burden of 
proof to the accused. State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 
1985) ( c i t i n g Francis v. Franklin. U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1965 
(1985) and Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 510 (1979) . £fie a lso 
S t a t e v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368, 1370-72 (Utah 1986); but cf . 
State v . Smith. No. 19283, s l i p op. (Utah S. Ct. Sept. 16 , 1986) . 
Respondent concedes that the in s t ruc t ions given in t h i s 
case contain the language found unconst i tut ional in Chambers. 
However, unlike the appel lant in Chambers, defendant's 
chal lenges t o these jury ins truc t ions were never presented t o the 
lower court . The defense neither offered i t s own proposed jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , nor objected t o those offered by the S ta te and 
given by the t r i a l court . See general ly the record at T. 206, 
211-12 and R. 85 , 108-110, 139-40 , 167-169. His f a i l u r e to 
timely object below t o the i n s t r u c t i o n s given precludes h i s 
r a i s i n g the i s sues for the f i r s t time on appeal. See Utah R. 
Cria. P. 1 9 ( c ) , Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1982)j S t a t e v. 
HfiUtn* 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985) ( f a i l u r e to object t o 
2
 These instructions and other relevant instructions given at 
t r ia l are provided in Appendix A of this brief. 
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instruction at tr ia l precludes challenge on appeal); State v. 
Barella. 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) (appellant must indicate 
from the record that he made a proper objection below); State v. 
Stegge l l . €60 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) (court wi l l not consider 
issues raised for the f i r s t time on appeal); State v. Valdez, 604 
P.2d 472, 474 (Otah 1979) (instructions not objected to at t r ia l 
cannot be raised for f i r s t time on appeal). 
Nor are the issues raised of such a nature or magnitude 
so as to just i fy invoicing the plain error rule given the record 
evidence of defendant's gu i l t . Utah R. Crim. Proc. 19(c) , Utah 
Coae Ann. S 77-35-i9(c) (1982).3 In Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 
787 (Utah 1986), the appellant claimed for the f i r s t time on 
post-conviction habeas corpus, that a jury instruction given at 
tr ia l impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and constituted a 
conclusive presumption on the element of intent and was therefore 
unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
Thi6 Court found that his fai lure to timely raise the issue in 
his earlier direct appeal4 precluded his belatedly raising the 
issue on habeas corpus. 716 P.2d at 788. In reaching th i s 
conclusion, this Court found that no extraordinary circumstances 
existed such as where there has been a substantial and ef fect ive 
denial of due process or where i t would be unconscionable not to 
3
 Unlike the appellant in State v. Hi l l , No. 20978, s l i p op. at 4 
(Utah S. Ct. Oct. 22, 1986) (J. Zimmerman, concurring) defendant 
has fa i led to even analyze the facts of this case in an effort to 
seek the benefit of any possible application of the plain error 
rule. £££ Point I I , JLnfia. 
* Sandstrom was decided after Lopez1 t r i a l , but 20 months before 
his direct appeal was decided. 
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review the conviction, so as to just i fy the Court's belated 
review of the claim despite Lopez' earlier procedural default. 
Id* Tnus, plain error was found inapplicable. 
LJ2££Z. i s in l ine with the view of numerous courts that 
challenges to such instructions Bust be timely made or waived. 
In Rollins v. Maggio. 711 P.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1983), 
petitioner had beiatealy challenged certain jury instructions on 
Sandstrom grounds. The reviewing court held as fol lows: 
Assuming that the ( tr ia l ) court's instruc-
tion did shift or rel ieve the State of a 
burden of proof, i t was necessary for Rollins 
to object to the charge under Louisiana law 
in order to preserve any error. . . . 
Wainwrioht v. Svkes preclude Is! any re l i e f 
by this court. 
S£S. Also Commonwealth v. White. 392 Mass. 282, 467 N.E.2d 79, 82 
(Mass. 1984) (alleged v io lat ion of SandBtrom not raised at t r i a l 
does not present prejudicial error warranting court's 
consideration)! Paul v. State . 176 Ga. App. 524, 336 S.E.2d 379, 
380 (1985) (fai lure to object to alleged Sandstrom error waived 
issue for appeal). £f*. Rose v. Clark. U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 3101 
(1986) (holding that the harmless error standard of Chapman v. 
California. 386 U.S. 18 (1967), applies t o jury instructions that 
violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 510 
(1979), and Prancis v. Franklin. U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1965 
- 8 -
( 1 9 8 5 ) ) . 5 AlJBLfi fffr State v. Knowles. 709 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 
1985) (instructional error held harmless); State v. Valdez, 604 
P.2d 472, 4/4 (Utah 1979; (court refused to invoke plain error 
rait on instructional error not objected to). 
Finallyf defendant has not asserted that his counsel's 
failure to timely object to the instructions constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, this failure is not 
of such magnitude as to amount to attorney ineffectiveness. See 
Smith v. Morris. 690 P.2d 560, 562 (Utah 1984); Codianna v. 
HfillJLBf 660 P.2d 1101, 1108-1114 (1983). 
5
 Specifically the United States Supreme Court observed in Rose 
v. Clark that: 
"Where a reviewing court can find that the 
record developed at t r ial establishes guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in 
fairness has been satisfied and the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
X X X 
Respondent received a full opportunity to put 
on evidence and make argument in support of 
his claim of innocence. He was tried by a 
fairly selected, impartial jury, supervised 
by an impartial judge. Apart from the 
challenged malice instruction, the jury in 
this case was clearly instructed that it 
had to find respondent guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt as to every element of both fir st-
and second-degree murder. . • • Placed in 
context, the erroneous malice instruction does 
not compare with the kinds of errors that 
automatically require reversal of an otherwise 
valid conviction. We therefore find that the 
error at issue here—an instruction that 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on 
malice is not 'so basic to a fair tr ial9 that 
it can never be harmless (cite omitted)•" 
106 S.Ct. at 3107. 
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Based upon the foregoing, defendant-appel lant f s 
chal lenges t o the jury i n s t r u c t i o n s should be summarily 
dismissed. 
fQIJHllil 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED FOR HIS FAILURE 
TO SUPPLY WIS COURT WITH ANY SUPPORTING LEGAL 
OR FACTUAL ANALYSIS OR TO REFER TO THE RECORD 
TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM. 
Defendant's e n t i r e claim of insuf f i c i ency of evidence 
i s contained in the fo l lowing two short sentences of h i s br i e f : 
Defendant contends that because there was 
no d irec t evidence placing Defendant in Summit 
County at the time of the commission of the 
o f f e n s e s , there was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence upon 
which a jury could conv ic t . 
Defendant concedes that t h i s argument i s 
more forceful as i t r e l a t e s t o appel lant 9 s 
convict ion for Burglary than as to Appellant*s 
convict ion for Theft, but, even as i t r e l a t e s 
t o t h e f t , there was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o 
j u s t i f y convic t ion for the crimes charged. 
A p p e l l a n t s brief at 5 . Defendant f a i l s t o i d e n t i f y those 
elements of the o f fenses charged which he claims were not proved 
by the S t a t e ; he f a i l s t o analyze any case authority r e l a t i n g to 
s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence claims on appeal or to h i s s i n g l e 
a s s e r t i o n that d irec t evidence i s required to prove an element of 
the o f fense ; he f a i l s t o explain why h i s argument i s more 
forceful as i t r e l a t e s t o h is burglary c o n v i c t i o n s ; 6 and he f a i l s 
6
 £ ! • State v . S e s s i o n s . 583 P.2d 4 4 , 45-46 (Utah 1978) (holding 
that the same inferences can be drawn from possess ion of recent ly 
s t o l e n property in a burglary case as in a larceny c a s e ) . 
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to analyse or even c i te the record facts of this case to support 
his claims in either the Statement of Pacts or Argument portions 
of his brief. 
The burden i s clearly on the appellant to show that the 
evidence was so insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable 
Binds aust have entertained a reasonable doubt that he committed 
the crime charged. State v. Nickles, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 
(Oct. 7 , 1986) , c i t ing State v. Dyer. 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983). 
Given the paucity of his argument he has clearly fai led to meet 
th i s burden. 
Moreover, th is Court in State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) refused to address mere conelusory 
allegations for which an appellant had fa i led to provide any 
analysis , saying, "Since the defendant f a i l s to support [her] 
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule 
on i t . " This Court has also repeatedly stated that an 
appellant's fai lure to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) 
(1985), by not c i t ing to the record to support his or her claims 
i s ground for summary affirmance. State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 
683 (Utah 1985); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); 
S t n ? Vt Steggel l , 660 P.2d 252, 253, (Utah 1983); State v. 
Wulffensteln, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah ) , cert , denied, 460 U.S. 
1044 (1983). 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's insufficiency of 
evidence claim should be summarily rejected. The State i s not 
inclined to guess at what defendant's contentions are or set up 
plausible arguments for him and then attempt to analyze them. 
• 1 1 -
The facts supporting defendant's convictions and the record 
c i tat ions to those facts have been provided in the S ta t«ent of 
Pacts portion of this brief Merely for the Court's rtftrance and 
to a s s i s t the Court in determining the applicabi l i ty of the plain 
•rror rule discussed in Point I , supra. 
The sole sufficiency of evidence issue framed by 
defendant requiring some response i s his claim that because there 
was a lack of direct evidence placing him in Summit County at the 
time of the offenses, the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
his conviction. This Court, in State v. Nickles, 43 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 20, 22 (Oct. 7, 1986), responded to such an assertion noting 
that i t i s a v e i l - s e t t l e d rule that circumstantial evidence alone 
may be suff icient to establish the gu i l t of the accused and that 
such evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if i t i s 
of such quality and quantity as to just i fy a jury in determining 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. Thus, a 
lack of direct evidence, as opposed to circumstantial evidence i s 
not of any consequence, especial ly where, as in this case, the 
defense otfered no affirmative defense so as to raise a 
reasonable alternative hypothesis of innocence. £f. State v. 
£111, No. 20978 s l i p op. at 2 (Utah S. Ct. Oct. 22, 1986) 
(plurality opinion). 
Finally, in State v. Smith. No. 19283, s l i p op. at 3-4 
(Utah S. Ct. Sept. 16, 1986), th is Court recognized that although 
unexplained possession of recently stolen property alone i s not 
suff ic ient to support a conviction of theft or burglary, i t i s a 
circumstance to be considered with other corroborating evidence 
12-
in determining gui l t or innocence. Such corroborating evidence 
may consist of the acts , conduct, falsehoods, if any, or other 
declarations, if any, of the defendant tending to show his gu i l t . 
fhe circumstantial indicators of defendant's gui l t in this case 
included more than unexplained possession of recently stolen 
property. Defendant was apprehended within hours of the 
discovery of the thefts and burglaries heading down the main 
interstate which services the Park City area, driving a vehicle 
loaded with the stolen property. When Trooper Buordon attempted 
to stop defendant's speeding Volkswagen, defendant, i n i t i a l l y 
fa i led to pull over. When he f inal ly did, he and McEwan began to 
run at the officer requiring the officer to draw his weapon and 
twice order them to stop. More irregular behavior then occurred. 
McEwan fled and defendant refused to even supply his name, 
address or date of birth to the off icer . The property 
inventoried from defendant's vehicle matched items missing from 
the condominiums. Defendant'6 passenger, McEwan worked as a 
housekeeper for the condominiums and had access to the 
burglarized units . McEwan admitted to a co-worker that he had 
stolen from them (Jupiter Property Management) and on April 9, 
1985 he told the co-worker that the prior evening he had been 
pulled over for a DUI (defendant was arrested on April 8 , 1985 
for DOI by Officer Buordon). The co-worker also overheard McEwan 
ask someone during a phone conversation on April 10th whether 
•he11 had been "popped on the burglaries* and warned that the 
police were going to run the numbers on the T.V.s and he was sure 
they would be arrested. All of this evidence clearly 
13-
corroborated defendant's unexplained possession of recently 
stolen property to enable the jury to draw the reasonable 
inference of defendant's gui l t of a l l charged offenses either as 
the direct perpetrator or as a party vho s o l i c i t e d , requested, 
commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided another in the 
commission of the crimes. £ejj Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1953), 
as amended; State v. Hi l l , No. 20978 s l i p op. at 5 (Utah S. Ct. 
Oct. 22 , 1986) C.J. Ball , dissenting) . 
CPNgpsiPN 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent submits the 
defendants burglary and theft convictions should be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s ^ V day of October, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL P. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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A person oommits t h e f t i f he obtains or exerc i s e s 
unauthorized control ovc nt property of an iother with a purpose 
t o deprive him thereof . 
Possess ion of property recently s t o l e n , when no 
sa t ia f actor y t « \ " I a"' m t i o n o f s n i c I \ po s se s s 1 o i» f h m n cl e, si > a 1 1 be 
deemed prima f a c i e evidence that the person in possess ion s t o l e 
the property (R* 167) . 
Instruct! on l l i . 
Possess ion of recent ly s t o l e n property which could have 
been obtained only by a burglarious entry in to a bui ld ing , when 
no s a t i s f a c t o r j explanat i on of such possess ion i s made, sha l l be 
deemed prima f a c i e evidence that the person in possess ion 
committed the burglary (R. 168) • 
Instruction I9i 
The term "Prima Facie" as used herein means, at f i r s t 
s i g h t ; on the f i r s t appearance; on the face of i t ; so far as cai I 
be judged from the f i r s t d i s c lo sure ; presumably; a fact presumed 
to be true , unless disproved by some evidence t o the contrary (R. 
1 6 9 ) . 
OTHER INSTRUCTIONS RELEVANT TO THE STATE'S BURDEN OF 
PROVING DEFENDANT'ft GUILT BEYOND ft HFASONAHI.T iMJifBI INI LUDh THI 
FOLLOWINGs 
Ins truct ion Nos. 3 ( in s t ruc t ions must be read as a 
whole) (K 14 7) i "I" ("burden remains on prosecution regardless 
whether defendant t e s t i f i e s ) (R. 151); 9 (burden on prosecution 
to prove al l elements beyond a reasonable doubt) (R. 154); 10 
(State Bust prove elements of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt 
(R. 155-56); 11 (State Bust prove elements of theft beyond a 
reasonable doubt) (R. 156-59); 12 (reasonable doubt defined) (R. 
160)f 14 (prosecution has burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that offenses were committed and that defendant committed 
them) (R. 163). 
